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Abstract: This study analyses the effect of local authorities in the Swiss cantonal parliaments on
the allocation of special school costs. The empirical findings show that a higher share of local
authorities in the cantonal legislature leads to a higher share of special school costs borne by the
cantonal authorities. The effect is stronger for mayors compared to all members of local
governments. Hence, mayors have a strong connection with their home municipality and use the
political power of the accumulation of mandates for shifting undesirable costs from the local up to
the cantonal level. This specific finding does not depend on the overall national constitutional
framework, as the introduction of the NFA (Neuer Finanzausgleich) – in the course of which the
federal state fully withdrew from financing special schools – has not changed the magnitude of this
effect.
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1. Introduction
How can local governments influence political outcomes at the higher state level? In the
absence of second chambers, lobbying activities such as face-to-face contacts or the
exchange of information are one strategy to influence the centre (Borck and Owings 2003;
Sørensen 2003). However, in Switzerland we also observe a more formal and direct form
of influence when considering mayors and other local councillors1 who sit in the cantonal
parliaments. Known as “cumul des mandats” in France – where it is an inherent part of
the political culture (Gremion 1976; Tarrow 1977; Dewoghela€ere et al. 2006; Francois and
Navarro 2013b) – the phenomenon of multiple-mandate holders is also present in
Switzerland. Members of local governments are present both in the federal parliament as
well as in the parliamentary chambers in the cantons (R€uhli 2012; L€uthi 2014: 185;
Mueller 2015; Pilotti 2017).
So far, the impact of these members of local governments has been analysed only
superficially. To date, there is no systematic comparison of the “cumul des mandats”
across all 26 cantons and their impact on political outcomes. This paper closes this
research gap.
1 Local councillors comprise all members of local governments, including mayors. Hence, I will use the term
“local councillors” when referring to all members of the local government with the mayors being a subgroup of
them.
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More specifically, I focus on a particular case where power relations between the
canton and the municipalities are at the core of the political debate. In the course of
the reform of the fiscal equalisation and task allocation between the Confederation and
the cantons (in the following referred to as NFA, short for “Neugestaltung des
Finanzausgleichs und der Aufgabenteilung zwischen Bund und Kantonen”), the federal
state fully withdrew from the financing of special schools (Sonderschulen). Before, the
national disability insurance (Invalidenversicherung IV) had paid individual contributions
per child and day at school. Given this complex governance structure as well as the
new paradigm of integrating special needs pupils into regular schools rather than
segregating them, this federal contribution was not considered adequate anymore. As a
result, the old system had to be replaced by a new one (Federal Finance
Administration 2013: 38; Mueller and Vatter 2016: 68). Two questions arise in this
context: How do the cantons react when a policy field suddenly becomes their exclusive
responsibility? And, more interesting in the context of this paper, how are the costs
connected with these new competences then distributed between the cantonal and the
local level?
Compared to other policy fields, the “return on investment” of special school
expenditures is rather low. While investments in the school qualification of pupils with
physical and/or cognitive deficits can promote the successful integration of these
pupils into the labour market, recent statistics show that a high proportion of around
40 percent of pupils with a special curriculum still does not find vocational training
after school (Federal Statistical Office 2016: 6). What is more, per-capita spending is
significantly higher compared to other investments in the educational sector, such
as for example stipends.2 Given such high costs with uncertain benefits, it can be
assumed that the costs related to special school pupils are unpopular among local
governments.
Looking at the data of the Federal Finance Administration (Eidgen€ossische
Finanzverwaltung), cantonal authorities come up for the majority of special school costs in
most cantons. While the NFA has led to a further cost centralisation in almost all
cantons, differences between the cantons are huge – both before and after the federal
reform of 2008.
Can these differences be explained by the representation of mayors and other local
councillors in the cantonal parliaments? Do they derive power from their mandate
accumulation for shifting the costs for special schools up to the higher state level (Horber-
Papazian and Soguel 1996; Mueller et al. 2015)? In the literature, the accumulation of
multiple mandates is discussed as one possible means for local governments to exert
influence on political outcomes at the higher level (Meylan et al. 1972: 279ff.; Bogdanor
1988; Page 1991: 60). By holding a seat in the cantonal parliament, members of local
governments do not only benefit from their legislative power in the plenary session or in
the parliamentary committees, they also have a privileged status regarding informal
contacts with civil servants and members of the cantonal government as well as public
appearance in the media (Cappelletti 2014).
In this paper, I use new data on the representation of members of local governments
in cantonal parliaments from 2007 to 2014. While data on Swiss mayors in cantonal
2 In 2014, cantons and municipalities spent almost 2 billion Swiss Francs for a total of 34’000 special school
pupils. This equals to almost 60’000 Swiss Francs spent in one year for one pupil (own calculation based on Swiss
Federal Finance Administration and Federal Statistical Office).
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parliaments has already been gathered in previous studies (R€uhli 2012; Mueller 2013;
Mueller 2015), this paper will, for the first time, also consider the representation of
other local councillors (i.e. members of local government in addition to the president of
the local council/the mayor). In doing so, it contributes to both national and
international literature on federalism, multi-level governance and local government
studies. Firstly, the paper provides a systematic analysis of the effects of the “cumul des
mandats” in Swiss federalism. So far, studies focusing on multiple mandate holders have
relied mainly on anecdotal evidence lacking a systematic and analytical approach.
Secondly, the focus on one specific policy field reformed by the NFA allows for
generating original empirical findings on the impact of the reform on the cantonal level.
Thirdly, by focusing on the presence of local authorities in the cantonal legislature as
an explanatory factor, the paper goes beyond the Swiss case and provides valuable
insights into the impact of local governments on the arrangement of policies at the
upper level of a decentralised polity.
The paper is structured as follows: The next section outlines the main features of the
cantonalisation of special schools in the course of the NFA. The third section then
addresses the theoretical background of mayors and other local councillors sitting in the
cantonal parliament and discusses the possible effect of such multiple-mandate holders on
political outcomes. In section 4, the research design is described, while section 5 presents
the empirical findings. The findings are discussed in section 6 before the paper ends with a
conclusion and an outlook for further research.
2. The Cantonalisation of Special Schools in the Course of the NFA Reform
The NFA was approved by a majority of 64 percent of the Swiss electorate on 28
November 2004. On 1 January 2008, it entered into force with totally 27 constitutional
amendments and more than 30 amendments to law (Braun 2008: 87f.). The rearrangement
was twofold: On the one hand, the NFA completely overhauled the fiscal equalisation
system (Neuer Finanzausgleich) between the federal level and the cantons (vertical
dimension) as well as among the cantons (horizontal dimension). On the other hand, the
reform provided for an extensive re-allocation of powers in numerous policy fields (Neue
Aufgabenteilung) (Broschek 2014). Amongst others, ten policy fields with formerly shared
responsibilities were fully transferred to the cantons (H€anni 2011: 95f.).
The regulation and financing of special schools is one of these ten policy fields. The
term “special schools” refers to pupils with physical and/or mental disabilities with special
educational needs who have a special curriculum either in segregated or in regular
schools.3 Until 2008, both the cantons and the federal state were responsible for financing
these pupils (Federal Finance Administration 2013: 33). The Swiss disability insurance
paid individual contributions per child and day at school, the rest was borne by the
cantons on the one hand, and (with the exception of a few cantons) by the municipalities
on the other hand (Federal Finance Administration 2013: 33). With the NFA in effect
from 1 January 2008 onwards, the federal state fully withdrew from financing this policy
3 http://www.szh.ch/themen/schule-und-integration/sonderschulen-oder-sonderklassen [accessed: 22.12.2016]. The
foundation Swiss Centre for Curative and Special Education (Stiftung Schweizer Zentrum f€ur Heil- und
Sonderp€adagogik) further differentiates between special classes (integration of pupils with special educational
needs in regular classes) and special schools (segregate classes). For reasons of simplicity, I will refrain from
making this distinction and refer to the term special schools only.
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field. Special schools became a fully cantonalised policy with the need to find a new
regulatory framework in all 26 cantons.4 This transfer of the policy into the cantonal
educational system also has to be viewed in the context of a paradigm shift to integrate
special needs pupils into regular classes whenever possible instead of segregating them
(Hutterli and Kronenberg 2013).
The transfer of tasks from the federal level to the cantons is accompanied by an
intercantonal concordat on the cooperation in the field of special needs education
(Interkantonale Vereinbarung €uber die Zusammenarbeit im Bereich der Sonderp€adagogik).
The concordat aims at enhancing the cooperation between cantons by setting up common
quality standards, a common terminology as well as a common evaluation procedure for
the determination of individual needs (Hutterli and Kronenberg 2013: 5). To date, 16
cantons have joined the concordat.5
A look at the financial statistics provides a first insight into how special school costs
within a canton (i.e. excluding federal contributions in the pre-NFA phase) have been
shared between the cantonal and local level so far. As Figure 1 shows, in 2006 and
2007 the cantonal authorities bore only slightly more than half of all subnational (i.e.
the sum of cantonal and local) costs concerning special schools.6 This changed
significantly from 2008 onwards. In 2008, the cantons on average accounted for 70
percent of cantonal and local costs; in 2011, the average share reached its peak with 77
percent. The last available data for 2014 report an average share of 72 percent. Hence,
we can draw a first conclusion from the financial data: While expenditures for
special schools within a canton have always been rather centralised than decentralised,
the NFA – and with it the withdrawal of the disability insurance from financing – has
further increased the centralisation of the inner-cantonal cost structure. Today,
almost three out of four Swiss Francs spent for special schools are spent on the
cantonal level.
Can these overall findings be corroborated throughout all cantons? Figure 2 ranks the
cantons by their centralisation of special school expenditures in 2014. It becomes apparent
that the differences between the cantons are huge. In six cantons, the cantonal authorities
come up for all the costs. In a further 14 cantons, the canton bears more than 50 percent
of the costs. In 6 cantons, the share of expenditures on the cantonal level is lower than 50
percent, thus indicating a decentralisation of most costs.
What accounts for these huge differences between the cantons? This paper comes up
with one possible explanation, namely the representation of mayors and other local
councillors in cantonal parliaments. The following section presents the theoretical
background behind this explanatory factor.
4 According to § 197 Ziff. 2 of the federal constitution, the previous services of the disability insurance had to be
ensured by the cantons at least until 1 January 2011 (Federal Finance Administration 2013: 33). After this
transition phase, the cantons could establish own regulations on the condition that they elaborate a concept
which informs about the guidelines, procedures, resource management and the institutional structure needed for
the cantonal regulation of special schools (Federal Departement of Finance and Conference of Cantonal
Governments 2007: 21). So far, 20 cantons have presented their concepts. For an overview of all the concepts and
the legal basis connected to special schools, see http://www.edk.ch/dyn/12917.php [accessed: 27.03.2017].
5 See for updates: http://www.edk.ch/dyn/19096.php [accessed: 27.03.2017].
6 The figures in this paragraph correspond to the mean cantonal cost share across all 26 cantons. Hence, the
degree of centralisation in every canton contributes equally to the average value, which assures that the value is
not affected by the bigger cantons.
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3. The Political Power of Local Authorities in the Cantonal Parliaments
It is an elementary feature of Swiss federalism that decentralised entities are involved in
decision-making processes with the possibility to influence higher-level political decisions
(Horber-Papazian 2004; Linder 2012: 161ff.). This is not only true for the representation
of the cantons in national politics but also for the political power of municipalities
within the cantons (Horber-Papazian and Jacot-Descombes 2014: 285ff.). While,
according to Ladner (2009), Swiss municipalities have difficulties “to place their concerns
directly on the agenda of national politics” (Ladner 2009: 330), their influence on the
cantonal agenda is considered to be stronger as municipalities enjoy a “traditionally
strong position [. . .] within the cantons” (Ladner 2009: 339). However, the access of
municipalities to central decision-making differs between the cantons: Firstly, we find
differences regarding institutional factors, e.g. the direct-democratic means available to
municipalities or their territorial overlap with electoral districts (Ladner 2009: 350;
Mueller 2015: 84ff.). Secondly, the political power of municipalities also differs when
looking at political actors and processes, where we find variance regarding the
decentralisation of the party structure or the existence and strength of Local Government
Associations (Mueller 2015: 81ff.).
Moreover, we can add a further strategy of interest representation at the central level,
namely mayors and other local councillors who simultaneously hold a seat in the cantonal
parliament (Mackenzie 1954). The accumulation of local and central mandates is a
widespread phenomenon in western democracies, with the French parliament as its
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Figure 1: Average share of the total of cantonal and local special school costs borne by the cantonal
level from 2006 to 2014 (mean of all 26 cantons)
Source: Own calculations based on data of Federal Finance Administration.
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archetype (Knapp 1991; Page 1991: 61f.; Dewoghela€ere et al. 2006; Navarro 2009;
Francois and Navarro 2013b). Ever since the Third Republic in 1870, holding a local
office was an important resource to become a representative in the national parliament
(Dogan 1967: 480f.; Best and Gaxie 2000: 110; Francois and Navarro 2013a: 19). Recent
statistics for 2012 show that more than 80 percent of the deputies in the national
legislature in France simultaneously held a mandate in their municipality (Bach 2012: 24).
The so-called “cumul des mandats” therefore is a vital part of French political culture
(Gremion 1976; Tarrow 1977; Smyrl 2004: 207); and as such it is very relevant: On the
individual level of the politician, it has a positive impact on electoral success, the influence
on parliamentary decisions and the money received from one’s own party for election
campaigns (Meny 1992; Francois and Navarro 2013a; Francois and Foucault 2013;
Ragouet and Phelippeau 2013). Considering the whole political system, the “cumul des
mandats” is said to impede the reform of local institutions and thus to favour the status
quo in France (Le Lidec 2008).
Even though research on the “cumul des mandats” is most advanced in France, the
phenomenon is also present in other European countries. According to the comparative
analysis of 29 European countries by Navarro (2013), the accumulation of national and
local mandates is present in all countries apart from 10 – mainly ex-Soviet – states where
it is prohibited by law. Next to France, the “cumul des mandats” is especially prominent
in Belgium, Finland and Luxembourg, where the share of local mandate holders exceeds
50 percent in all the three national parliaments (Navarro 2013: 126).
Turning to Switzerland, a study recently conducted by Pilotti (2017, see also Pilotti
et al. 2010) shows that, in the year 2016, almost 13 percent of the members of the two
parliamentary chambers simultaneously held a seat in a municipal executive. From a
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Figure 2: Share of special school costs borne by the cantonal level in 2014
Source: Own calculations based on data of Federal Finance Administration.
Playing the Vertical Power Game 121
© 2017 Swiss Political Science Association Swiss Political Science Review (2017) Vol. 23(2): 116–143
longitudinal perspective, this share has constantly been above ten percent throughout the
whole 20th century, while the accumulation of national and cantonal mandates (member of
the cantonal government or parliament) has decreased considerably in the last decades
(Pilotti 2017: 267).
When looking at cantonal parliaments, we find even higher shares in most cantons. In
2014, in six cantonal parliaments at least every fourth person was a member of
government of a municipality.7 In Solothurn, Thurgovia, Appenzell Outer-Rhodes and
St. Gall, the mayors are especially dominant with a share of more than 15 percent of all
the cantonal parliamentarians. There are only four parliaments with no mayors, while
other local councillors are present in all the cantonal legislatures (see Figure 3). These
multiple mandate-holders are all democratically legitimised. In Switzerland, both members
of the cantonal parliaments and of the local governments (including mayors) are elected
by the citizens, either by ballot box votes or – in a small proportion of the municipalities –
by the municipal assembly; Neucha^tel is the only canton where municipalities elect their
executive either by popular vote or by the parliament (Ladner 2011: 8).
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Figure 3: Share of mayors/local councillors in cantonal parliaments in 2014 (as % of total MPs)
Notes: *= no data available for local councillors. For data sources see Table A2 in the Appendix.
7 This paper only considers the representation of members of local governments in the cantonal parliament. The
inclusion of further local authorities, such as the local parliament or members of school councils, is not possible,
since in many cantons data on these other forms of the “cumul des mandats” either do not exist or are
incomplete. Moreover, mayors and other local councillors are most involved and thus most sensitive for local
politics (Francois and Navarro 2013b). Finally, the inclusion of members of municipal parliaments would distort
the analysis, since in many municipalities the legislative body is the citizen assembly, i.e. there is no local
parliament.
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So far, little attention has been paid to the “cumul des mandats” of mayors and other
local councillors in cantonal legislatures. Empirical contributions can be found for the
Canton of Vaud in 1950 (Meylan et al. 1972: 281) as well as for the Cantons of Fribourg,
Valais, Neucha^tel, Jura and Geneva (Horber-Papazian 2004: 54). Recently, R€uhli (2012)
and Mueller (2015) have collected data for 2011 and provide a systematic overview over
all cantons; while the former relies on expert interviews, the latter has analysed the
declaration of interests published by the parliamentary services.
Apart from these descriptive analyses, empirical studies about the consequences of the
“cumul des mandats” in Swiss cantons are even rarer. Cappelletti (2014) finds evidence
that local governments which are represented in the cantonal parliament receive larger per
capita amounts of equalisation grants. The study, however, only includes 16 cantons and
does not consider the effect of multiple-mandate holders on overall cantonal political
outcomes.
From a theoretical point of view, different scholars argue that, the stronger local
authorities are represented in the central parliament, the better they can assert their
interests at the higher state level. For Page (1991: 60), the accumulation of mandates is a
suitable indicator to measure the influence of local authorities at the centre. Similarly, in
the view of Meylan et al. (1972), the accumulation of mandates at the local and the
cantonal level can be seen as an indicator of “representation and defence of municipal
interests”. Bogdanor (1988: 84) even argues that the unification between two political
levels is better assured by multiple mandate holders than by the pure existence of a second
chamber.
These general considerations of the political power of the “cumul des mandats” help
to theorise the influence of mayors and other local councillors on the allocation of
special school costs. Members of local governments have an interest to keep local
expenditures for special schools as low as possible for several reasons. Given the high
costs for one special school pupil without a guaranteed payoff (in terms of successful
integration in the labour market), expenditures in the field of special schools have a
comparably low “return on investment”, unlike other expenditures such as scholarships
for students or regional development programs. Furthermore, the benefits generated by
special school expenditures (e.g. reducing social costs due to labour market integration)
are not necessarily limited to the entity where the investments originate from. Finally,
the strategies for special needs education are outlined in the cantonal concepts
elaborated in the aftermath of the NFA (Federal Finance Administration 2013: 36).
Hence, an increase in financial participation is only weakly linked to an increase in local
competences in the policy field.
Given these considerations, it is reasonable to assume that mayors and other local
councillors act as “revenue maximizers” for their municipality by using their legislative
power to “shift” special school costs up to the cantonal level (Greve 2012: 189). Or, in the
words of Horber-Papazian and Soguel (1996: 2, own translation): “every state level tries to
transfer costs to another entity whilst trying to keep as many decision-making rights as
possible”.
Influence can be exerted at different stages in the decision-making process. Firstly,
multiple-mandate holders can use their privileged position in the pre-parliamentary
phase. As members of the cantonal parliament, they regularly travel to the capital of
the canton and move in spheres where they have direct contact with cantonal
stakeholders (K€ubler and Michel 2006). Their direct access to civil servants and
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members of the cantonal government provides them with good lobbying opportunities.
Without being a member of the cantonal legislature, this lobbying would be much
more difficult.
Secondly, parliamentarians can benefit most from their position if they are members of
the committee responsible for proposals that particularly affect their interests (Cappelletti
2014). In Switzerland, committee decisions predetermine political outcomes to a great deal,
providing good opportunities for single parliamentarians to influence a bill (Vatter 2016:
278). This also applies to local authorities: The higher the share of members of local
governments in a cantonal parliament, the higher the probability that at least one of them
also belongs to the committee responsible for the special school-financing proposition
(Mueller 2015: 79).
Thirdly, local authorities without direct access to the committee can influence the
corresponding bill in the parliamentary assembly by proposing an amendment of the
committee’s proposition. At this stage, they can also form a coalition in order to
coordinate collective action and consolidate political power across party boundaries
(Cappelletti 2014). In doing so, members of the coalition can advocate for their local
interests in their own party fraction. As the phenomenon of multiple mandate holding is
not restricted to particular parties, it can be expected that a “local coalition” increases
local influence at the expense of partisan interests (Tavits 2009).
Finally, a legislative mandate also involves privileges outside the boundaries of the
political-administrative system. Parliamentarians have better access to the media and can
influence public opinion on specific issues more easily (Cappelletti 2014). These privileges
become even more important in case of a referendum. In this case, easy access to public
opinion is of utmost importance as the decision making process has left the
parliamentarian borders and has entered the direct democratic arena.
In sum, being a member of the cantonal parliament entails a variety of advantages
throughout different stages of the decision-making process. Thus, the following hypothesis
can be formulated regarding the influence of mayors and all local councillors respectively
on the inner-cantonal allocation of special school costs: The better the municipalities are
represented through mayors/local councillors in the cantonal parliament, the better they can
shift the special school costs up to the cantonal level.
I will now explain the research design to test the hypothesis before I present the
empirical findings in Section 5.
4. Research Design
The research design chosen for this study is a subnational comparison of the 26 Swiss
cantons before and after the NFA became applicable. In doing so, the study takes profit
of the federal system in Switzerland which provides an ideal “laboratory” for comparative
research (Vatter 2002; Braun 2003). While the common constitutional framework of Swiss
federalism keeps a variety of possible intervening variables constant, the different
institutional organisations of the cantons provide for an interesting variance of variables,
which helps to explain differences regarding the allocation of special school costs. I will
first explain the operationalisation of my dependent and independent variables and then
present my method.
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4.1 Operationalisation
My dependent variable is the centralisation of special school expenditures in the 26 Swiss
cantons.8 The data are provided by the Federal Finance Administration, which lists annual
expenditure figures for both the cantonal and the local level. For the measurement, I
divide the total expenditures on the cantonal level by the total expenditures on the
cantonal and local level. I multiply the results by 100 to arrive at the share of costs that is
paid by the cantonal level. For the calculation, I consider inner-cantonal transfer payments
within the policy field of special schools which are provided by the Federal Finance
Administration as well.9 The variable ranges from 0 to 100, 0 indicating full
decentralisation and 100 full centralisation of the cost structure.
My two key independent variables relate to the share of mayors and all local councillors
(including mayors) respectively in the cantonal parliament. To calculate this variable, I
divide the number of mayors as well as the number of all local councillors sitting in a
cantonal parliament by the total number of seats in that parliament. Again, by multiplying
the result by 100, I arrive at the percentage values. Mueller (2015) proposes a second
operationalisation by dividing the number of local government members by the total
number of local governments in a canton. However, what matters for the empirical
analysis in this paper is not the outside representativeness of the multiple-mandate holders
for all the local governments in a canton, but their political power inside the parliament. I
thus refrain from including this second approach. The data corresponds to my own
collection of local political mandates of the parliamentarians in the 26 cantons.10 For the
models in the analytical part of this paper, I will calculate two variables, with the first one
including only the mayors and the second taking all the members of local governments
(i.e. local councillors) into account. In order to model the causal influence of the variable
in the best way, I will use the previous year’s figures.
To assess the net influence of the NFA on the centralisation of expenditures, I will
include a dummy variable for the presence/non-presence of the federal reform,
respectively. The multiplication of this dummy with the key independent variables allows
distinguishing between the influence of mayors/local councillors before and after the NFA.
In order to prevent spurious findings, further control variables will be included into the
models. A first group of variables entails further institutional and political factors that
facilitate the exertion of local influence over cantonal political outcomes.11 A first index
focuses on the strength of Local Government Associations. It will be measured by
assessing the existence of an official name, a functioning website, publicly available
association statutes and the institutionalisation of meetings of Local Government
Associations. In order to account for the influence of the electoral system, a second index
8 Due to missing data, not all 26 cantons can be included in the empirical analysis (see variable description in
Table A1 in the Appendix for more details).
9 For the databases and the calculation of the dependent variable, see Table A1 in the Appendix.
10 For the collection of local mandates, I have relied on three groups of data sources: Lists of interest ties (based
on self-declaration of parliamentarians), lists of elected local authorities in the municipalities (“Staatskalender”,
municipal election results and lists directly provided by the cantonal administration) and own surveys among the
municipalities. Lists of interest ties were only consulted when the quality of the lists (i.e. the completeness) was
high. When comparing the cantons for which I had to rely on lists of interest ties with the rest of the cantons, I
do not find indication for a systematic underestimation of the “cumul des mandats” in the former group of the
cantons. For a detailed table with the figures and the data sources for all cantons, see Table A2 in the Appendix.
11 All three indices have been elaborated by Mueller (2015). For a detailed description of measurement, see Table
A1 in the Appendix.
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captures the territoriality of the electoral system. Municipalities are most favoured by the
electoral system if constituencies correspond to the municipalities. At the other extreme,
the electoral system is most centralised when the whole canton is a single constituency (as
in Geneva and Ticino). Finally, a third index focuses on direct democratic means available
for local governments. While in some cantons local governments can use both the
initiative and the referendum to voice their concerns on the cantonal level, neither
instrument is available to local authorities in other cantons. The variable included in the
analysis accounts for the existence of such instruments as well as the institutional barriers
to utilize them.
It can be further expected that the inner-cantonal allocation of special school costs is –
in the sense of a path-dependent effect – related to the overall decentralisation of resources
within a canton. I will thus include a further variable measuring the overall
decentralisation of resources in a canton relying on Mueller’s (2015) index of “policy
decentralisation”. The index is based on the cantons’ fiscal decentralisation, but also takes
the share of local administrative resources into account. The latter is especially important
for the case at hand, considering the need for organising a new policy field within the
existing administrative structure of a canton. In order to capture the hypothesized “path-
dependent” effect, I use the figures’ mean value from 1990 to 2006 for all 26 cantons.
A further group of control variables takes into account possible policy-specific
differences between the cantons. The number of pupils in special schools accounts for
possible effects of the magnitude of the demand for this public service. Membership in the
concordat for special needs education controls for the possible effect that inter-cantonal
coordination obliges cantons to keep as many resources as possible at the centre.
Finally, the political, structural and socio-cultural context of a canton will be included.
Firstly, the share of parliamentary seats held by left-wing parties controls for possible
effects of the party system in a canton. Secondly, the number of municipalities accounts
for the fragmentation in a canton, which has proven to correlate negatively with
centralisation of overall expenditures in Swiss context (Schaltegger and Feld 2003).
Thirdly, a dummy for German-speaking cantons will be included in order to control for
possible effects of the political culture. Finally, the urbanisation of a canton, measured by
the share of residents living in urban areas, will be included.12
4.2 Method
In order to test the formulated hypothesis, I will compare the centralisation of special
school expenditures in the cantons at two points in time. Data for 2007 allow for assessing
the level of centralisation shortly before the NFA entered into effect in 2008. The
corresponding data for 2014 are the last available data. The time span of seven years
assures that the effects of the NFA can be assessed in the long run, instead of considering
only short-term effects which might not have been consolidated yet.
Given the hierarchical data structure with 26 cantons each containing two points in time
(2007 and 2014), multilevel models with random intercepts for each canton are applied
12 A further possible structural control variable would be the population size of a canton. This variable, however,
highly correlates with the number of special school pupils. Hence, for the purpose of this paper, the number of
special school pupils will be included in the analysis instead of the total number of residents.
126 Tobias Arnold
© 2017 Swiss Political Science Association Swiss Political Science Review (2017) Vol. 23(2): 116–143
(Steenbergen and Bradford 2002).13 For the estimation of the parameters, I use a Bayesian
approach which, given the data structure at hand, is preferable for two reasons. Firstly,
the Bayesian approach does not assume data to be randomly sampled. Instead it treats
data as a complete survey with the goal to find the model that best matches the given data
structure (Jackman 2009: XXXIf.). This corresponds perfectly to the data used in this
paper, which are exhaustive non-repeatable data for all the 26 cantons. Secondly, given the
need to apply a hierarchical model, Monte Carlo experiments have shown that Bayesian
multilevel models perform better than equivalent frequentist models, especially when the
number of level-2 units is small (Browne and Draper 2006; Stegmueller 2013).
Bayesian estimation results yield the mean and standard deviation of the posterior
distribution, which can be interpreted as in a standard frequentist regression. The mean is
the average effect of a parameter (i.e. independent variable) on the outcome (i.e.
dependent variable); the standard deviation helps to assess the statistical reliability of the
estimation results.14
5 Empirical Findings
In order to test the effect of the independent variables on the outcome variable I proceed
as follows. Firstly, I estimate a baseline model, which only includes the share of mayors
and all local councillors respectively, the NFA-dummy, as well as the respective interaction
term. A second model examines whether the estimates of the baseline model are confirmed
even if all the predictors are included. Finally, a third final model is estimated by only
including those predictors of model 2 whose credible intervals indicate a clear direction of
influence (i.e. did not include zero).
Figure 4 presents the means of the parameters for the Bayesian estimations with the
corresponding 90% and 95% credible intervals for the two final models. The results of the
baseline and the full models are listed in Tables A3 and A4 in the Appendix.
Regarding the influence of mayors, the model estimations clearly show that a higher
share of mayors in the cantonal parliaments leads to a higher centralisation of special
school costs in a canton. For all the three models, the posterior mean is above zero with a
95% credible interval not containing zero. While in the baseline model the mean is 1.05,
this value even increases when control variables are included. The final model yields a
posterior mean of 2.1, indicating more than a 2 percentage point increase of the cost
centralisation with a 1 percentage point increase of the share of mayors in the cantonal
legislature.
Looking at the NFA-dummy it becomes clear that the federal reform – even while
controlling for further control variables – has clearly increased the share of special school
13 Actually, the data structure at hand is hierarchical in two ways: The years 2007 and 2014 are clustered within
cantons and cantons are clustered within the two years. While the year-level is already captured by the NFA-
dummy itself (0 for 2007 and 1 for 2014), random intercepts for the cantons are used to capture the canton-level.
14 The Bayesian models have been estimated in R using the package MCMCglmm (Hadfield 2010). For the
specification of priors I have used non-informative normal priors for the fixed effect parameters and inverse
Wishart priors for the variance component. The convergence of the chains has been checked by extensive
graphical inspections of the trajectories and the autocorrelations as well as by Geweke and Heidelberg
diagnostics. The chains of all the models presented in this paper have mixed well and converged. The models were
run for 400’000 iterations, with a burn-in of 200’000 and a thinning of 50. The change of the number of iterations
and a slight change of the priors have not changed the results. More detailed information on the model
specifications and the different sensitivity tests can be obtained upon request.
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costs borne by the cantonal level. According to the final model, the NFA has led to a 16.4
percentage point increase in the cost centralisation.
When the share of mayors in cantonal parliaments is interacted with the presence/non-
presence of the NFA-reform, the magnitude of the effect for mayors increases slightly. The
effect of 1 percent of mayors sitting in the parliament is 0.3 percentage points higher for
the time when the NFA is in force compared to the situation before the federal reform.
However, considering Figure 5, it becomes clear that the two credible intervals overlap
largely. Hence, the positive effect of mayors on the cantonal cost centralisation is mainly
an effect of its own and hardly depends on the federal reform.
Within the group of control variables, several systematic effects can be found.
Accordingly, the more a canton decentralises all of its resources to the municipalities
(expenditures, revenues, administrative resources), the less special school costs are
centralised at the cantonal level. In addition, the number of pupils in special schools
positively correlates with the centralisation of special school costs. The same applies for
the membership in the inter-cantonal concordat: the horizontal coordination of a canton
within the scope of the concordat for special needs education leads to an additional
Figure 4: Explaining cantonal cost centralisation: posterior distribution of final random intercept
models with mayors/local councillors in cantonal parliaments
Notes: Mean as well as the 90% and 95% credible interval of posterior distribution. Bayesian
estimation using MCMCglmm package in R (Hadfield 2010). For the baseline model and the full
model (with all parameters, including those without a systematic effect), see Tables A3 and A4 in the
Appendix.
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increase of the cost structure by 4.7 percentage points. Furthermore, the number of
municipalities positively correlates with the centralisation of the cost structure, which
stands somewhat in contradiction to previous empirical findings about the influence of the
inner-cantonal fragmentation on overall expenditure (de)centralisation. Finally, the
strength of left-wing parties seems to be linked to decentralisation instead of centralisation
of the cost structure. This finding might be surprising at first, but could be explained by
the left-wing support for a more integrative approach regarding special school pupils. A
decentralisation of policy resources may be crucial in order to foster the integration of
these pupils into decentralised regular classes instead of segregating them in centralised
special schools.
No “centralising” effects can be found for the further political variables which are
expected to facilitate local influence on cantonal policies. Neither the territoriality of the
electoral system nor the availability of direct democratic instruments for local governments
helps to explain the level of cost centralisation in a canton. Although we find a positive
posterior mean for both parameters, none of them can be considered systematically
positive when credible intervals are taken into account. Interestingly enough, a strong
Local Government Association leads to a higher share of costs borne by the
municipalities. Hence, when looking at the different possible channels of influence for local
authorities, the share of mayors in the parliament appears to be the only variable that is
systematically positively linked with the centralisation of special school costs in a canton.
Turning to the models for local councillors, the findings do not differ greatly from those
for the mayors. All three models indicate a positive effect of the share of local councillors
in the cantonal parliament on the centralisation of special school costs in a canton.
However, the magnitude of the effect is lower when compared to the one for mayors. The
Figure 5: Marginal effect of mayors/local councillors in cantonal parliaments with and without the
NFA
Notes: Mean as well as the 90% and 95% credible interval of posterior distribution. Bayesian
estimation using MCMCglmm package in R (Hadfield 2010).
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baseline model reveals a 0.9 percentage point increase of the centralisation with a 1
percentage point increase of the share of local councillors. The effect slightly increases
with the inclusion of control variables. According to the final model, centralisation
increases by 1.1 percentage points for every additional percent of local councillors in the
parliament.
The NFA effect is also strong when local councillors are included. This time, the
interaction term with the share of local councillors is even negative, with a credible
interval not including zero. Hence, the positive influence of local councillors on cost
centralisation is mainly restricted to the period before the NFA. However, when looking
at the magnitude of the effect, one has to put the relevance of this finding into perspective.
The effect only decreases by 0.3 percentage points after the NFA compared to before.
Hence, even though the credible interval of the interaction term indicates a high reliability
of this effect, the relevance of this effect is highly restricted.
6. Discussion
How can we interpret these empirical results in the light of the formulated hypothesis?
Generally, the findings confirm the expectation that a higher share of members of local
governments in the cantonal legislature leads to a stronger centralisation of special school
costs. Hence, local authorities use the political power of the “cumul des mandats” for
shifting unwanted costs from the local up to the cantonal level. This effect is stronger for
mayors than for other members of local governments. Therefore, it is especially the
president of the local council who seems to have a strong connection with his home
municipality and who takes a “brokering role” by transferring local interests to the centre
(Tarrow 1977; John 2001: 136).
Interestingly, this effect is the only positive one that could be found within the group of
political factors that are expected to facilitate the exertion of local influence on higher level
political outcomes. A favourable institutional condition for local actors – such as
constituencies that (almost) match the boundaries of municipalities and low barriers for
local governments to use direct democratic instruments – did not prove to have an effect
on cost allocation. Hence, a purely institutional perspective is not expedient when
assessing the power relations between the centre and the municipalities. Institutions only
provide a framework within which actors are needed for a policy change to occur. The
existence and strength of Local Government Associations is even negatively connected to
cost centralisation. It follows that the direct representation in the cantonal political-
administrative system proves to be much more efficient than any other efforts of lobbying
and coordination outside these boundaries.
Despite this general boosting effect of the “cumul des mandats” on cost centralisation,
the NFA – in the course of which the federal state fully withdrew from financing special
schools – did not lay out a new “battlefield” for local authorities to exert influence on cost
reallocation. Even though the overall cost centralisation has markedly increased in most
cantons, the presence of local government members in the legislature cannot explain the
variance of this increase between the cantons. Rather, the influence of local authorities has
already existed before the federal reform. This is entirely plausible, as quite possibly the
centralisation rates had already been disputed before 2008. In many cantons, they
fluctuated around the “magical” value of 50 percent, that is the threshold above which the
cantonal level starts to come up for the majority of the costs.
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In sum, the empirical results of this study confirm the expectation in the literature that
local interests are best represented with local representatives directly holding a seat in the
higher-level parliament (Meylan et al. 1972: 279ff.; Bogdanor 1988: 84; Page 1991: 60).
The hypothesis is thus confirmed. The results indicate a clear pattern of exertion of
influence regarding the issue of cost allocation in a policy field. Local governments have
no interests in coming up for costs in a policy field where expenditures are not directly
linked to revenues. In the recent past, we have found several episodes that stand in line
with this finding: In 2015, the cities of Zurich, Winterthur and Dietikon urged their canton
to increase its contribution for social assistance15; one year later, there was a dispute in the
same canton between the two state levels regarding the responsibilities for the costs of
placing children in homes16; and in the course of current austerity measures in the canton
of Lucerne, the municipalities threatened to make use of the municipal referendum for the
first time ever.17 Hence, the findings are in line with previous experience stating that local
governments want to maintain as many decisional capacities as possible whilst trying to
get rid of the provision of unattractive and/or costly public services (Horber-Papazian and
Soguel 1996; Mueller et al. 2015).
7. Conclusion
The aim of this study has been to analyse the impact of mayors and other local
councillors elected to the cantonal parliament on the cost allocation within the policy field
of special schools. In order to do so, the study has benefited from new data on the
presence of local authorities in all 26 cantonal parliaments.
The findings suggest that a higher presence of local government members in the
cantonal parliament leads to a higher share of special school costs that is borne by the
cantonal level. While the influence of all the members of local governments is rather
limited in scope, mayors in cantonal parliaments have proven to be key actors when it
comes to defending local interests in central decision-making. This finding has important
implications both for Swiss federalism and beyond.
Considering the Swiss federal system, the results suggest that one has to take into account
the huge variance regarding the “cumul des mandats” in the cantons when assessing the
power relations in a canton. The empirical findings of this study show that multiple
mandates can be effectively used by local governments to maximize their revenue (Greve
2012). This is in line with previous empirical analyses by Cappelletti (2014) and calls for
more attention to be given to the effects of the “cumul des mandats” phenomenon. The
degree of mandate accumulation in cantonal parliaments is not necessarily linked to
institutional differences regarding local autonomy. Hence, the accumulation of mandates
can be of crucial importance for local politics, even in cantons where institutional
centralisation is comparatively high (such as in the French speaking cantons).
The relevance of multiple-mandate holders is also high when taking into account the
national level. Considering the involvement of the cantons in the national decision-making
process, the literature has mainly focused on the vertical institutions of federalism, such as
the cantonal majority in constitutional referendums or the cantonal legislative referendum
(Linder 2012: 161ff.; Vatter 2016: 459ff.). This study suggests that the direct representation
15 Sch€urer, A. (2015). “Jacqueline Fehr will die Gemeinden entlasten”. Neue Z€urcher Zeitung, 17 November 2015.
16 Hudec, J. (2016). “Kanton will Millionenkosten abwenden”. Neue Z€urcher Zeitung, 17 September 2016.
17 Aschwanden, E. (2016). “Gemeinden proben den Aufstand”. Neue Z€urcher Zeitung, 19 October 2016.
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of members of cantonal (and local) governments in the national parliament is a further –
non-institutionalised – element of vertical influence in the Swiss federal system.
The findings are relevant beyond the Swiss case with regard to the necessity to take
actors and processes into account more strongly when assessing power relations between
the centre and the periphery. This study has also shown that institutional factors expected
to facilitate local politics (namely the electoral system and direct democratic means for
local governments) are less important than the direct representation of lower-level
authorities in the higher-level parliament. Hence, the current debate about power relations
between centre and periphery and local government systems in general needs to consider
the accumulation of local and central mandates as one further element of local politics
(Pratchett 2004; Wolman 2008; Ladner et al. 2016).
The “cumul des mandats” can be a promising means for local authorities to exert influence
on political decisions at the centre also in less or even non-federalised countries, where local
and regional authorities find themselves in less favourable institutional settings. Looking at
the four European countries where the accumulation of local and central mandates is most
present – Belgium, Finland, France and Luxembourg –, Belgium is the only state with a
federalised state structure (Navarro 2013: 126). There is no a priori reason to assume that the
representation of local interests via the accumulation of mandates is only restricted to federal
states. So far international research on the consequences of the “cumul the mandats” has
focused mainly on the effects for the individual politician such as regarding electoral success
or activity in the parliament (e.g. Blais 2006; Francois 2006; Foucault 2006; Maddens et al.
2006; Francois and Navarro 2013b). The study at hand suggests that a more macro-oriented
analysis of effects could yield interesting results beyond the case of Swiss federalism.
Finally, the study also yields interesting results from a normative point of view. It can
be questioned whether the accumulation of multiple mandates is rather fruitful or
detrimental for a political system. While multiple-mandate holders are closely connected to
citizens which allows the latter to bring their concerns into the parliamentarian system
more easily, the “cumul des mandats” can also be criticized for harming the federal
principle of “one region, one vote” as it puts some regions in a better position than others.
Cappelletti (2014) has already shown that municipalities with one or more executives in
the cantonal parliament are better off when it comes to the regulation of equalisation
grants. The same effects could also be relevant for other policy issues: For example, when
a canton needs to decide where to build asylum homes or which infrastructure decisions to
take (e.g. roadbuilding, leisure facilities). The findings of this study suggest to take the
phenomenon of multiple mandates more seriously and to discuss its implications for the
functioning of a democratic system.
The study has taken a close look on the impact of the “cumul des mandats” in one
specific policy field. While this approach benefits the internal validity of the findings, the
empirical results are limited in several ways that call for further research. Firstly, the
analysis needs to be expanded to other policy fields in order to get a more generalizable
understanding of the consequences of the “cumul des mandats”. There might be other
policy fields where the takeover of policy-related costs is attractive for local governments,
especially when they are connected to an increase of competences or when long-term
“returns on investment” are expected.
Secondly, the present study has looked at the “cumul des mandats” from a macro-
perspective, which does not allow deriving conclusions about the causal mechanisms at the
level of individual legislators. Given this well-known limitation in macro-quantitative
comparative studies (e.g. when the influence of parties is assessed on political outcomes),
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further research following a more micro-based and qualitative approach could help to get
a more in-depth understanding of the action “behind” the macro-effect found in this
study. In fact, even though the study at hand finds evidence that the “culture” of
mandate-accumulation – as measurable on the macro-level – is positively linked to local
influence over cantonal policies, the political outcomes at the macro-level are still the
results of interactions of individuals (i.e. the parliamentarians) in a given decision-making
process. It would therefore be of particular interest to take a closer look at the political
interests of single legislators, their strategies and actions in the decision-making process
(e.g. in the parliamentary committees) as well as their ability to build local coalitions
across party lines.
Finally, the findings should encourage scholars to shed more light on multiple mandates
from an international point of view as well. The accumulation of mandates is neither
restricted to the local and regional level, nor to federal countries. Further studies could
thus take an internationally comparative perspective by analysing the impact of local and
regional authorities in the national parliaments. Such an analysis would then allow for
assessing the impact of the “cumul des mandats” in different institutional settings. Is “the
state capture from below” (Mueller et al. 2015) only limited to federalised and
decentralised states? Or does it prove to be an important channel of influence also for
local governments in centralised unitary states by compensating the otherwise rather
limited local influence on higher-level political outcomes?
It will be up to further research to attain a more in-depth understanding of the
consequences of the “cumul des mandats”. The present study provides strong arguments
for considering multiple-mandate holders more seriously when addressing the capacity of
lower-level authorities to influence higher-level policies in their own favour.
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Appendix
Table A1: Variable Description
Variable Operationalisation Data source
Centralisation of
special school costs
Own calculations based on four databases
provided by the Federal Finance
Administration: 1. Cantonal expenditures
for special schools including transfer
payments to the municipalities; 2. Local
expenditures for special schools including
transfer payments to the canton; 3.
Transfer payments from the cantonal to
the local level within the policy field of
special schools; 4. Transfer payments from
the local to the cantonal level within the
policy field of special schools. For both the
cantonal and local expenditures vertical
transfer payments are considered: In order
to get the effective amount of expenditures
for both levels I subtract the transfer
payments received from the other state
level from the expenditures (which include
the transfer payment to the other state
level). For example, if the statistics in a
canton reveal a) cantonal expenditures
including transfer payments (to the local
level) of 1.2 million Swiss Francs and b)
local transfer payments to the cantonal
level of 100’000 Swiss Francs, the effective
amount of expenditures for the cantonal
level is 1.1 million Swiss Francs. After
having done the same calculation for the
local level, the centralisation equals the
share of the cantonal expenditures on the
total expenditures (cantonal + local) in the
canton. No data are available for the
canton of Schaffhausen for the year 2007.
Federal Finance
Administration
Share of mayors in the
cantonal parliament
Total previous year’s number of presidents
of political municipalities in the cantonal
parliament divided by the total number of
seats in the parliament, multiplied by 100.
Missing values for the cantons of Fribourg,
Vaud, Valais and Jura for the year 2006:
mean values for the years 2010-2014 used
instead. For the cantonal data sources see
Table A2 in the Appendix.
See Table A2
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Table A1: Continued
Variable Operationalisation Data source
Share of local
councillors in the
cantonal parliament
Total previous year’s number of members of
governments of political municipalities in
the cantonal parliament divided by the
total number of seats in the parliament,
multiplied by 100. Missing values for the
cantons of Berne, Fribourg, Vaud and
Valais for the year 2006: mean values for
the years 2010-2014 used instead. No data
available for the cantons of Grisons and
Jura. For the cantonal data sources see
Table A2 in the Appendix.
See Table A2
NFA Dummy variable indicating whether the
NFA reform is in force; 0 = NFA is not in
force (year 2007), 1 = NFA is in force (year
2014).
Own coding
Strength of Local
Government
Associations
Index based on Mueller (2015) including the
following indicators: 1) degree of
institutionalisation, 2) a functioning website
indicating a permanent and professional
structure, 3) public availability of the Local
Government Associations’ statutes (legal
personality), 4) existence of a special group
in the cantonal parliament to represent and
lobby for local interests. The scores for the
four indexes are added to the total score
for the strength of Local Government
Associations. The maximal value is 4.
Mueller (2015)
Territorial electoral
system
Index based on Mueller (2015) measuring
the cantonal electoral decentralisation. 0 =
the whole cantonal territory is just one
constituency (no territorial representation
of municipalities); 1 = use of special
electoral districts (at least some territorial
dimension to parliamentary elections); 2 =
use of administrative districts (territorial
distinctiveness with certain sense of
regional identity); 3 = use of historic
regions and fragmented administrative
districts; 4 = constituencies perfectly
correspond to the municipalities.
Mueller (2015)
Direct democratic
instruments for local
governments
Index based on Mueller (2015) measuring
the existence of the communal initiative
and referendum in a canton as well as the
barriers to call them. Index ranges from 1
(low direct-democratic decentralisation) to
4 (high direct-democratic decentralisation)
Mueller (2015)
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Table A1: Continued
Variable Operationalisation Data source
Overall
decentralisation
Index based on Mueller (2015) measuring
the local share of public expenditures,
public revenues, administrative
expenditures, public staff and salaries for
public staff. The index equals the mean of
the z-standardised values of the five
indicators. For all indicators, mean values
for the time range from 1990 to 2006 have
been used.
Mueller (2015)
Special school pupils
(in 1’000)
Number of special school pupils divided by
1’000
Federal Statistical Office
Member special school
concordat
Dummy variable indicating the membership
in the concordat for special needs
education (Sonderp€adagogikkonkordat) in
the previous year. 0 = no membership, 1 =
membership.
Swiss Conference of
Cantonal Ministers of
Education
Left-wing parties Own calculations based on the share of seats
in the cantonal parliament of the following
parties: Social-Democratic Party, Green
Party, Labour Party [formerly Communist
Party], other small left-wing parties. No
data are available for the canton of
Appenzell Inner-Rhodes.
Federal Statistical Office /
Annee Politique Suisse,
several years.
Number of
municipalities
Number of municipalities in a canton Federal Statistical Office
German-speaking Dummy variable indicating whether canton
has 1 = majority that is German-speaking,
0 = otherwise
Federal Statistical Office
Urbanisation Percentage of urban population Federal Statistical Office
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Table A2: Number of Mayors/Local Councillors in the Cantonal Parliaments in 2006 and 2013 and
the Corresponding Data Sources
Canton
2006 2013
Data source
Number
of mayors
in
cantonal
parliament
Number
of local
councillors
(including
mayors) in
cantonal
parliament
Number
of seats in
cantonal
parliament
Number
of mayors
in
cantonal
parliament
Number
of local
councillors
(including
mayors) in
cantonal
parliament
Number
of seats in
cantonal
parliament
ZH 9 26 180 12 28 180 Staatskalender
BE 13 32* 160 15 34 160 List of
interest ties
LU 8 20 120 10 21 120 List of
interest ties
UR 1 7 64 0 3 64 Staatskalender
SZ 1 6 100 1 5 100 List of local
auth.
OW 0 3 55 0 5 55 Own survey
NW 1 4 60 1 2 60 Staatskalender
GL 7 14 80 9 18 60 List of local
auth.
ZG 0 3 80 1 3 80 Staatskalender
FR 16* 33* 110 16 34 110 List of
interest ties
SO 8 16 100 17 27 100 List of
interest ties
BS 1 5 130 0 3 100 Own survey
BL 2 12 90 3 13 90 Local elect.
results.
SH 7 11 80 1 10 60 Staatskalender
AR 9 15 65 10 16 65 Staatskalender
AI 6 17 49 2 15 49 Staatskalender
SG 15 36 180 18 36 120 List of local
auth.
GR 15 n.a. 120 17 n.a. 120 List of
mayors
AG 11 26 140 19 36 140 List of
interest ties
TG 20 25 130 22 29 130 List of
interest ties
TI 8 18 90 8 21 90 Local elect.
results.
VD 27* 36* 180 22 30 150 List of
interest ties
VS 9* 41* 130 10 41 130 List of
interest ties
NE 3 15 115 2 17 115 List of
interest ties
140 Tobias Arnold
© 2017 Swiss Political Science Association Swiss Political Science Review (2017) Vol. 23(2): 116–143
Table A2: Continued
Canton
2006 2013
Data source
Number
of mayors
in
cantonal
parliament
Number
of local
councillors
(including
mayors) in
cantonal
parliament
Number
of seats in
cantonal
parliament
Number
of mayors
in
cantonal
parliament
Number
of local
councillors
(including
mayors) in
cantonal
parliament
Number
of seats in
cantonal
parliament
GE 4 5 100 4 8 100 List of local
auth.
JU 3* n.a. 60 3 n.a. 60 List of local
auth.
Notes: *no data available for 2006, mean values for the years 2010-2014 used instead.
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Table A3: Explaining Cantonal Cost Centralisation: Posterior Distribution of Baseline, Full and
Final Random Intercept Models with Mayors
Mean
2.5%
quantile
97.5%
quantile
Baseline model
Intercept 47.48 37.92 57.55
Share of mayors in parliament 1.05 0.77 1.33
NFA 15.20 14.23 16.17
Share of mayors in parliament * NFA 0.03 0.15 0.08
N = 49
Full model
Intercept 84.94 15.73 187.32
Share of mayors in parliament 2.15 1.81 2.48
NFA 16.38 14.48 18.35
Strength of Local Government Associations 22.25 45.94 0.14
Territorial electoral system 2.50 18.61 22.73
Direct democratic instruments for local governments 1.19 12.24 14.18
Overall decentralisation 24.97 52.46 2.91
Special school pupils (in 1’000) 12.11 11.19 13.02
Member special school concordat 4.68 2.73 6.54
Left-wing parties 1.45 1.72 1.17
Number of municipalities 0.26 0.23 0.29
German language 13.72 76.99 48.56
Urbanisation 0.00 0.01 0.01
Share of mayors in parliament * NFA 0.33 0.20 0.47
N = 49
Final model
Intercept 84.21 41.10 127.42
Share of mayors in parliament 2.14 1.81 2.48
NFA 16.38 14.48 18.25
Strength of Local Government Associations 22.42 38.26 6.70
Overall decentralisation 28.75 47.43 9.03
Special school pupils (in 1’000) 12.09 11.18 12.99
Member special school concordat 4.68 2.79 6.54
Left-wing parties 1.45 1.73 1.18
Number of municipalities 0.26 0.22 0.29
Share of mayors in parliament * NFA 0.33 0.20 0.48
N = 49
Notes: Bayesian estimation using MCMCglmm package in R (Hadfield 2010).
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Table A4: Explaining Cantonal Cost Centralisation: Posterior Distribution of Baseline, Full and
Final Random Intercept Models with Local Councillors
Mean
2.5%
quantile
97.5%
quantile
Baseline model
Intercept 40.79 30.24 51.52
Share of local councillors in parliament 0.89 0.72 1.07
NFA 24.29 22.97 25.61
Share of local councillors in parliament * NFA 0.45 0.53 0.38
N = 45
Full model
Intercept 35.46 135.66 63.55
Share of local councillors in parliament 1.49 1.31 1.67
NFA 36.59 34.88 38.37
Strength of Local Government Associations 19.82 43.01 3.18
Territorial electoral system 11.73 9.06 32.99
Direct democratic instruments for local governments 0.72 15.45 14.53
Overall decentralisation 15.64 44.96 12.84
Special school pupils (in 1’000) 10.71 9.85 11.61
Member special school concordat 9.95 11.59 8.37
Left-wing parties 2.91 2.68 3.15
Number of municipalities 0.03 0.01 0.08
German language 15.22 81.67 49.14
Urbanisation 0.01 0.02 0.00
Share of local councillors in parliament * NFA 0.30 0.38 0.21
N = 45
Final model
Intercept 21.71 10.76 54.7
Share of local councillors in parliament 1.11 0.93 1.3
NFA 34.48 32.24 36.61
Strength of Local Government Associations 13.19 25.15 1.5
Special school pupils (in 1’000) 9.33 8.43 10.22
Member special school concordat 6.67 8.69 4.65
Left-wing parties 1.04 0.73 1.35
Share of local councillors in parliament * NFA 0.42 0.51 0.34
N = 45
Notes: Bayesian estimation using MCMCglmm package in R (Hadfield 2010).
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